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Too Little, Too Late: How the Government could have prevented the fall of Arthur Andersen 
By Justin Miller 
Arthur Andersen's accounting fraud, later 
costing investors and corporations billions in losses, 
could have been stopped had adequate governmental 
regulations been in place to uphold the quality 
auditing of corporations. Auditing is the outside 
accountant's main responsibility: double checking 
financial statements to verify a company's status. 
Any failure to uphold quality accounting warrants a 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
investigation, and legislation should be enacted to stop 
repeated examples of accounting malevolence. 
Many are familiar with Arthur Andersen's 
fraudulent partnership with Enron and WorldCom as 
they were major news stories that received 
tremendous media coverage. However, the list of 
companies that Andersen improperly audited is 
lengthy and dates back to the early Nineties (Squires 
113). The public is largely unaware of this early 
deception because, for example, when Arthur 
Andersen allowed the books to misrepresent the 
financial picture of the Baptist Foundation of Arizona, 
(BFA). The BFA eventually settled their lawsuit 
without being fully punished (Bartlett v. Andersen 1 
9). 
Andersen's fraudulent partnerships piled up 
into crescendo of corporate deceit. Legislation like 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in response to Enron 
and WorldCom, should have been passed after the 
BFA scandal. Self-regulation in the accounting 
industry failed miserably at stopping Andersen's 
deceit. Effective legislation would have curtailed 
some of the worst examples of corporate fraud this 
country has ever seen. 
An Overview of Andersen 
Arthur Andersen was formed in 1913, and "for 
89 years it was the mainstay of the accounting 
profession holding a reputation for honesty and 
trustworthiness" (Squires 10). In the Eighties it was 
so dominant that the eight major accounting firms 
were known as Arthur Andersen and the Seven 
Dwarfs (Squires 5). Just before the collapse, 
Andersen had offices in 350 cities worldwide and was 
previously known as the "Marine Corps of 
Accounting," for their quality audits and good 
reputation (Arthur ^ 1, Fowler f 20). It employed 
85,000 and worked for some 100,000 clients (Arthur f 
1, Ex-Andersen ^ 1). Somewhere down the line 
Andersen strayed from its reputable beginnings, 
turning unethical and greedy. 
The immediate cause of the shift in ethics came 
after a period of sixty years. The leadership of Harvey 
Kapnick grossly expanded Andersen's size through 
partnerships. This practice was continued through the 
early Nineties. Though strong leadership had made 
the firm a global accounting giant, it grew so fast it 
lost sight of its humble beginnings out of greed 
(Squires 73, 77, 89). 
Weak Regulation Lays Foundation for Deceit 
Investment groups and stock brokers watch 
earnings statements of corporations and will only buy 
if favorable economic gains are on the horizon. 
Arthur Andersen misstated financial statements and 
neglected its auditing responsibilities to augment 
positive earnings reports for the corporations it 
represented. Auditing successful companies on the 
rise meant greater financial success for Andersen 
itself. Thus, this cycle of greed led to more profit and 
more greed. Andersen lost sight of its responsibility 
to the investing public and was willing to deceive 
investors for its own financial profit (Letters f 3). The 
company began to hire employees of similar 
personality types, often referred to as Andersen 
Androids. They specifically hired young, quiet, non-
combatant workers who would pose the smallest 
chance of blowing the whistle on the firm's scams 
(Squires 125). 
America needed the SEC to step up its watch of 
accounting practices and corporate fraud, but the 
government standard in the Nineties was ineffectual. 
It merely called for various small organizations like 
the Public Oversight Board. Such organizations were 
known as Self-Regulating Groups because the 
accounting industry was and had been a self-
regulating industry for decades. These groups took on 
much of the power that the SEC should have claimed. 
The SEC's limited powers were set up so that the 
government could limit the amount of bureaucracy 
given to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
upon its establishment. This move proved to be a 
multi-billion dollar mistake. 
A number of specific examples of corporate 
accounting fraud led to the demise of Arthur 
Andersen. Throughout five examples the government 
did not do enough to prevent future auditing fraud. 
Rather, the government followed a policy of 
appeasement philosophy and merely fined Arthur 
Andersen and was foolish enough to believe the 
firm's, "promise not to repeat the behavior" (Fowler f 
18). 
Sunbeam 
Going bankrupt in 1998, the Sunbeam 
Corporation and its auditor Arthur Andersen were the 
epitome of mismanagement. This first example of 
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accounting fraud and restated earnings was so bad that 
the SEC had to step in and curtail the partnership of 
CEO "Chainsaw" Al Dunlap and Andersen (Sunbeam 
| 1, Squires 120). Together they misappropriated 
funds and misstated accounting books to make it seem 
like the appliance manufacturer was rebounding after 
a few bad years (Sunbeam f 6). Going beyond its 
negligent role in the BFA scandal, Andersen now 
readily took part in the accounting fraud for the sake 
of its own increased revenues. It shredded documents 
that would have incriminated both Andersen and 
Sunbeam executives. The SEC finally stepped in after 
bankruptcy was filed. This was only after Andersen 
helped the company fraudulently misstate $189 
million (Settlement f 5). 
In Bankruptcy Court, Andersen paid only $110 
million to the shareholders of the company it was 
financially corrupting (Settlement f 7). The SEC 
investigated Andersen for the first time in what would 
later prove to be their final years, yet failed to bring 
them to adequate justice (Squires 119). The legal 
consequences in two consecutive scandals hardly 
could bring them down. The absence of a strong 
enforcer of the already weak accounting regulations in 
regards to auditor fraud was the direct reason for 
Andersen's numerous scandals. They were breaking 
the law, profiting, and paying minimal fees if and 
when they were discovered. Greed was rampant and 
the opportunity to make more fraudulent money was 
out there. There are many other partnerships in which 
Andersen definitely took advantage of that 
opportunity. 
Arizona Baptists 
Andersen's next illegal accounting scam dealt 
with the Baptist Foundation of Arizona. Serving as 
BFA's auditor, Andersen failed to realize the company 
was running a "Ponzi" investment scheme (Bartlett v. 
Andersen H 1). Such a scheme involved pooling the 
individual retirement account balances of some 13,000 
elderly people into a fraudulent pyramid (Squires 
117). The money from new investors was used to pay 
off older investors but BFA and Andersen got a cut of 
the profit. After five years of scandal the BFA filed 
for bankruptcy when its scheme ran out of investors. 
The SEC was nowhere to be found, but smaller 
agencies like the Arizona Board of Accountancy 
eventually stepped in to review financial statements 
(Squires 118). 
Andersen claimed to know nothing about the 
"Ponzi" scheme, yet in March 2001, it settled out of 
court after the BFA sued them for misstating the 
accounting books (Bartlett v. Arizona f 2). How 
much did Andersen agree to pay in a case where it 
admits no wrongdoing? $217 million was ordered to 
be paid to millions of investors (Squires 118). If it 
had nothing to hide, the Andersen legal team would 
have stuck it out in court rather than concede $200 
million, and ended the investigation. 13,000 
grandmothers and grandfathers were duped into 
investing their retirement funds so that BFA and 
Andersen would gain financially. Andersen knew the 
scheme was unethical and illegal, but neglected its 
duties as an auditor for increased profit. In the end, 
Andersen was never truly brought to justice. It had 
reimbursed the investors for some of the money they 
had failed to protect, but this punishment was not a 
deterrent for future scandal. 
Waste Management 
Arthur Andersen had been partners with Waste 
Management, Inc. for three decades without legal 
troubles. However, the Nineties led to greed on both 
sides of the partnership that ended in SEC settlements. 
Since no strong accounting fraud deterrents were in 
place, billions of dollars were dishonestly misstated. 
Former Andersen employees were Waste 
Management top financial executives and also many 
incriminating documents vanished (Squires 120). 
Tragically, this was only the third-largest instance of 
accounting fraud in which Arthur Andersen was the 
audit partner. Signing off on a $1 billion income 
overstatement and veiling $1.7 billion worth of 
liabilities over six years, the SEC finally stepped in to 
stop the corruption (Squires 121). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as 
we have seen, is quite good at beginning its 
investigations. Executing justice based on its 
findings, however, is a different story. Out of court 
settlements were the only consequences Andersen 
faced in three consecutive massive accounting 
scandals. After six years of greedy accounting fraud, 
Andersen was fined a mere $7 million (Squires 120). 
The SEC failed to bring criminal obstruction of justice 
charges against Andersen. It had only warned the firm 
that "if it were ever involved in a similar case, the 
consequences would be more severe" (Squires 119). 
Blatantly neglecting its own duty to prosecute Arthur 
Andersen, the SEC issued a $7 million dollar fine and 
a warning (Squires 120). Warnings do not deter future 
scandal they merely facilitate the opportunity for it to 
arise. At last, the SEC had sufficient evidence to take 
down Andersen before it did more to hurt American 
corporations, yet they failed miserably. Blame for the 
Enron scandal, the next "similar case," falls partly 
upon the lax implementation of punishment by the 
SEC (Squires 120). 
Enron 
The Houston energy titan was the ninth largest 
corporation in America right before all the document 
shredding had begun (Squires 127). David Duncan 
led Arthur Andersen's audit of the Enron Corporation. 
Personally choosing his audit team, Duncan knew that 
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in Enron he would be, "handling a potential time 
bomb" (Squires 127). Enron was a much larger 
corporation than those previously discussed in this 
report. Thus, it entailed even more corruption. Enron 
in the late Nineties was in a constant state of forming 
partnerships with smaller Special Purpose Entities. 
These "off-the-books" partnerships were a way to 
boost financial statements. Enron's SPEs were 
illegitimate because they were not true partnerships. 
Enron owned nearly all the shares of their 3,500 SPEs, 
in nearly every case more than the 97% that was 
allowed by law (Squires 9). Andersen overlooked its 
duties to the investing public and signed off on these 
partnerships (Letters f 3). It could do this because the 
government did not have adequate accounting 
regulations in place. 
The main corporate fraud of Enron is 
analogously explained by Margaret Ceconi, a former 
Enron employee. She states, "Say you have a food 
company that makes both hot dogs and ice cream. 
The hot dog stand is making money, and the ice cream 
stand is losing money. So the company puts the ice 
cream losses on the profitable hot dog books...since 
the ice cream stand and the hot dog stand have the 
same owner, is this legal?" (Squires 9) 
Such a practice is most definitely illegal, the 
only legal practice would be to keep two sets of books 
and transfer some funds from hot dog to ice cream 
stand. However, Andersen allowed Enron to do the 
illegal version of the practice repeatedly. For 
example, Andersen allotted $1 billion in losses onto 
just one of the SPEs in which Enron owned more than 
the legal 97% interest in. Andersen also failed to stop 
Enron when they sold so-called "energy contracts" 
which were actually illegitimate loans (Squires 9). 
This deception worked for Andersen until 2001. 
The first-quarter earnings did not match the 
accounting books and people began to question the 
Enron-Andersen partnership. On October 16th Enron 
absorbed a one-time loss of $1 billion and admitted it 
had not stated $618 million in loses (Squires 8). 
Immediately in an all-night frenzy of paper shredding 
and electronic deletion, Andersen strove to wipe out 
the records of accounting fraud that dated back years 
(Letters |^ 2). Its actions were similar to the Sunbeam 
case that it obstructed in the investigation of what 
happened at Enron. This time they would not be so 
lucky. 
The ensuing SEC investigation into Enron was 
halted due to destroyed evidence. Arthur Andersen 
and mainly David Duncan's auditing team were 
criminally charged with obstruction of justice (Fowler 
^ 9). He would later go to jail and Andersen's market 
reputation was critically weakened (Squires 5). 
Arthur Andersen was initially forced to pay only $40 
million and was trying to negotiate its way out of 
well-deserved punishment, but its firm was in 
shambles (Ex-Andersen | 1). Top executives were 
jailed, and it was fined yet again. Finally, after many 
scandals throughout the past Nineties, "The 
government decided Andersen's record was too 
egregious to ignore, so they treated it as a repeat 
offender. The negotiations failed and Andersen was 
indicted" (Fowler f 19). 
Their later Enron punishment was a $500,000 
fine and five-years of probation (Fowler f 1). 
However, the government failed to shut Arthur 
Andersen down. The SEC was on the right track 
getting closer to stopping Andersen, yet would be 
duped yet again. After Enron it allowed this 
repeatedly unethical firm to have one last chance to 
deceive investors and to break the law. While the 
Grand Jury was indicting them for obstruction of 
justice at Enron, another larger scandal was about to 
erupt. 
WorldCom 
St. Louis telecommunications giant WorldCom 
"prove[d] to be the final nail in the coffin," for its 
auditor Arthur Andersen (Treanor ^ 1). WorldCom 
filed for bankruptcy in 2002, making it the largest 
U.S. filing in history—dwarfing that of Enron. Arthur 
Andersen withheld crucial financial statements for 
years leading up to the bankruptcy. After admitting to 
misstating $3.85 billion, the SEC investigated just 
how much of a suspected $408 million in loans was 
part of a cover-up. Obviously not learning anything 
and acting out of greed, Andersen auditors looked the 
other way as debts were underscored and assets were 
upgraded (Associated f 7). Andersen withheld crucial 
accounting figures to increase the revenues it gained 
from consulting and started to shred documents once 
again before it was caught. The destruction ended in 
August 2002 when the firm had lost its license to audit 
on the market (Fowler 1 12). The SEC had finally 
caught up with the elusive Arthur Andersen, and the 
firm completely crumbled in the wake of their 
investigation into WorldCom (Associated f 3, Squires 
149). 
Immediate Changes 
It took more than five years and over five 
billion dollars in scandalous accounting before the 
American Government stopped Arthur Andersen. 
This travesty, however, led to changes in our legal 
stance on corporate fraud. President George W. Bush 
immediately increased the SEC's budget after the 
Enron Scandal (Squires 150). A 77% augmentation, 
$766 million annually would go towards stopping 
future malevolence. In 2002, William H. Donaldson 
was named the new head of the Commission. He 
plans to upgrade the technology and hire a 
significantly larger legal staff in the hope of restoring 
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investor confidence to the American public (Squires 
151). 
Throwing money at the problem, however, will 
not deter any future scandals. The real reforms came 
in the passing of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Davis 
16). Sarbanes-Oxley was a direct response to Enron 
and WorldCom, finally ensuring quality auditing for 
all publicly held companies (Squires 151). An 
extremely concise summary involves an actual auditor 
combining forces with the CEO, CFO, and a five 
member board of CPAs and outside attorneys (for 
example, the District Attorneys). All five will take on 
greater responsibilities and their work will be 
overseen by a new organization (Davis 16). 
Replacing the old self-regulatory ways of the 
accounting industry, Sarbanes-Oxley set up the Public 
Company Oversight Board, or PCOB (Squires 151). 
Finally the government has established reputable 
authorities in the accounting industry that could help 
the auditing process. All of the failures of the past 
five years may be prevented from happening in the 
near future (Davis 16). 
five years unable to curtail their fraudulent accounting 
practices. 
At least stronger legislation has finally been 
implemented, and Arthur Andersen is no more. Still, 
one can only hope that another rogue accounting firm 
in the future does not exploit the government in the 
future. Upon researching the Andersen accounting 
scandal one asks themselves a profound question on 
commerce. Does greed make fraud inevitable? 
Perhaps, yet it is up to the government to step in and 
punish corporations and protect investors and the 
economy. 
Was Andersen's Fraud Destined to Happen? 
The rebuttal to the belief that the Government 
failed to stop Andersen before nearly all investor 
confidence had been shaken is that there was nothing 
the government could have done. Accounting 
legislation similar to Sarbanes-Oxley might never 
have been passed after, for example, Sunbeam, 
because it was not urgent. We know that new laws 
often fail to even reach the Congress and if they do, 
deliberation on issues can take months at a time. 
Perhaps a post-Enron Sarbanes-Oxley is something we 
should be glad to have had passed at all. Necessity to 
establish accounting regulations in the wake of Enron 
may have been the only thing that would've ever 
caused the law to be enacted. 
Was the fraud inevitable? 
The once ultra-reputable Arthur Andersen had 
lost almost a century's worth of its respect in the 
accounting world in less than one fraudulent decade. 
The greed of Arthur Andersen led it to repeatedly 
break the ethics of accounting and law. The American 
government allowed this fraud to happen while the 
self-regulating accounting industry could not bring 
down this rogue firm. From the Arizona Baptists to 
WorldCom, Andersen had ripped through the 
confidence of many American investors for over five 
years. Billions of dollars were lost by both 
shareholders and employees. Not enough had been 
done to stop Andersen before Enron; because too little 
authority had been placed in the hands of the POB and 
the SEC. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted much 
too late—we allowed many of Andersen's rampant 
misdeeds to continue far too long and were for over 
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